


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**DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE**

# *WEEKLY SUMMARY*

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5 September 1969  
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(Information as of noon EDT, 4 September 1969)

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**SECRET****FAR EAST**

Circumstances surrounding the announcement of the death of Ho Chi Minh on 4 September suggest that the North Vietnamese leadership had already worked out a consensus on lines of authority and policy goals before the aged leader died. Some form of collegium will probably rule in Hanoi for the time being, but strains may develop as the leadership seeks to achieve the agreed goal of a unified Vietnam. At this time, party theoretician Truong Chinh seems likely to emerge as a dominant figure in the new regime.

In South Vietnam, President Thieu disregarded publicized ideas about broadening the base of his government and, instead, appointed a new cabinet that he believes will be responsive to his direction. Thieu's cabinet, including Prime Minister Khiem and Foreign Minister Tran Van Lam, suggests that the President is now willing to make greater use of men who gained their administrative or political know-how working with the former Diem regime or its elite Can Lao party. There is evidence that Thieu expects the new cabinet to be less innovative and more administrative than the former Huong government.

In Laos, the government guerrilla forces of General Vang Pao have overrun territory in the Plaine des Jarres that has been in Communist hands since 1962. The ease with which the government has advanced may mean that the enemy was taken by surprise. Past experience suggests the Communists can probably oust the guerrillas with relative ease when the current rainy season ends.

Pyongyang's demand for a formal apology before the crew of the US helicopter shot down on 17 August will be returned is a propaganda effort designed to mask North Korea's policy failures and impress the domestic audience. None of North Korea's preconditions for unification of the Korean peninsula—Kim Il-song's primary goal—has been accomplished. The major goals of the seven-year plan, for example, have not been met after ten years. The low level of infiltration and subversion against South Korea this year may result almost as much from Pyongyang's domestic problems as from stepped-up South Korean security.

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## VIETNAM

The death of Ho Chi Minh removes the figure who has dominated the Vietnamese Communist movement for the past 40 years. Although he long ago removed himself from the day-to-day conduct of affairs, he continued to exercise the deciding voice in resolving policy disputes within the party leadership. Ho surrounded himself with men who shared his broad goals, including that of a unified Communist Vietnam, and who have generally managed to work together in pursuit of these goals despite differences of approach and emphasis.

It thus seems likely that Ho's successors will, at least in the near term, maintain continuity with current policies. It is indeed probable that, prior to the first statement about the gravity of Ho's condition, made at 4 a.m. in Hanoi on 3 September, some consensus over the transfer of authority had already been worked out.

Over the longer term, the North Vietnamese leadership may run into greater trouble in reaching agreements and in carrying out major decisions than when Ho's unassailable prestige and authority were available to them. For example, last spring, the politburo held a prolonged review of strategy and presumably set forth a relatively firm course of ac-

tion regarding the war. This was indicated by such subsequent initiatives as the issuance of the Liberation Front's ten-point peace proposal and the creation of the Provisional Revolutionary Government for the South. The general paralysis that set in after these moves, however, probably coincided with a sudden deterioration in Ho's health and reflected renewed tugging within the leadership over how to proceed in the South and at Paris. Xuan Thuy's hint at Paris on 3 September that a more rapid reduction of US forces could produce some movement may indicate that the period of indecisiveness caused by Ho's terminal illness is over.

Although Le Duan, as party first secretary, has been a prime candidate to succeed Ho, there is evidence that his policies of subordinating everything to the pursuit of goals in the South has cost him stature over the past year or so. Increased prominence is now being given to the more orthodox views of party theoretician Truong Chinh and Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap. To maintain the facade of unity within the leadership in the difficult times following Ho's death, it seems likely that Ho's mantle will fall, at least for an initial period, to some form of collegium of key leaders.

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Political Developments in  
South Vietnam

Despite considerable talk about broadening the base of South Vietnam's government, President Thieu proved unwilling to "politicize" the new cabinet announced last week. He instead appointed ministers who, he believes, will be responsive to his direction. The major realignment took place in the economic sector, which has been one of Thieu's major concerns. One factor leading to the fall of the Huong government was its inability to slow the spiraling rise in the cost of living.

Thieu's cabinet selections show an increasing reliance on men such as Prime Minister Khiem, Foreign Minister Tran Van Lam, and several lesser ministers who were identified with the former Diem regime and its elite Can Lao Party. This may indicate Thieu's belief that he needs persons with experience in running a government and in working together as a disciplined group.

Of the handful of politicians in the new cabinet, Lam, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Education Dr. Nguyen Luu Vien, and Minister of State without portfolio Dr. Phan Quang Dan are among the most prominent. Thieu was unwilling to appoint any major party leaders from his own political group, the National Social Democratic Front, regard-

ing them as essentially self-seeking and venal. Instead, the front is represented by three minor politicians--one of whom is Thieu's cousin--who should be easier for Thieu to control. Presumably bringing an opposition point of view into the cabinet is retired general Pham Van Dong, the new minister of veterans affairs and a member of Senator Tran Van Don's National Salvation Front. Dong, however, has not been as outspoken against the government as has Don.

Prior to the naming of the new cabinet there was also talk that an "advisory council" of prominent civilians would be established. So far Thieu has not followed through on this idea either. He has apparently made some headway, however, in the creation of progovernment voting blocs in the National Assembly. Thieu also believes that Khiem and his ministers will be able to get along better with the assembly than did Huong, perhaps the prime consideration in the decision to ease the elder statesman from office.

Thieu's reported plans to reorganize his personal staff, both to assist him in policy formulation and to improve coordination between the presidential palace and the cabinet, suggest that the new prime minister and his cabinet will be even less innovative and more administrative than the Huong government was.

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
Military Developments

Military activity remained relatively light during the week,



The largest battle of the week took place some 85 miles north of Saigon, where South Vietnamese irregulars on patrol ran

into a larger North Vietnamese unit and suffered over 150 casualties. The South Vietnamese unit had been seeking to engage the enemy force and prevent it from attacking remote allied outposts and provincial towns. Elsewhere in the country Communist terrorists were active, causing considerable civilian losses in several incidents, but there was little sustained combat.



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## NORTH KOREAN PROPAGANDA MASKS FAILURES

Pyongyang's demand that the UN Command formally apologize before it will return the crew of the US helicopter shot down on 17 August follows the pattern of a similar incident in 1963 and of the negotiations leading to the release of the crew of the Pueblo last year. Pyongyang considers that such apologies give it great prestige and provide visible evidence for domestic use by Kim Il-song's regime of a "cunning victory" over the archenemy.

Such propaganda gambits are probably increasingly necessary to Kim's government. The North Korean leadership has been continuously frustrated in its announced effort to attain unification of the Korean peninsula "with in our generation." None of North Korea's preconditions for unification--a stronger military and economic bastion in the North, a rapid growth of indigenous revolutionary sentiment and activity in the South, and a climate of "positive" international support for unification--is being accomplished. On 24 August, Kim implicitly acknowledged to a foreign press agency that unification lies far in the future.

The North Korean economy and people are overtaxed by the triple demands of providing sustenance, expanding the industrial base, and modernizing the armed forces. Three years after the original target date, the major goals of the seven-year development plan have still not been met. Nor has North Korea gained much interna-

tional backing for its unification efforts. Most importantly, Peking and Moscow have been cool to Pyongyang's subversion program. The recent border clashes between these two Communist giants have probably lessened in Pyongyang's eyes the deterrent effect of both countries' mutual defense treaties with North Korea.


This summer, Pyongyang propaganda media continued to emphasize a "developing revolutionary situation" in the South but made almost no reference to armed struggle. The daring commando raids and agent infiltrations directed against the South in 1967 and 1968 succeeded only in further antagonizing the South Koreans. Although sea infiltration of agents has continued, no commando raids have been staged since March, and incidents along the Demilitarized Zone have been at the lowest level since 1966. Even after years of effort, Pyongyang's subversive apparatus in the South is still too fragmented and weak to capitalize on the turmoil stirred up there by the issue of a constitutional change to permit President Pak to run for a third term.

The low level of activity in the South may reflect a reappraisal by Kim's regime of its past tactics there. Violent actions may appear more and more unproductive and risky in the light of North Korea's domestic problems and South Korea's demonstrated ability to counter infiltration and subversion.

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# LAOS: Current Situation



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## LAO GOVERNMENT FORCES MAKE SUBSTANTIAL GAINS

Meo leader Vang Pao's guerrilla forces have pushed their counteroffensive deep into the Plaine des Jarres, overrunning territory that has been in Communist hands since 1962. The unexpected ease with which the government has advanced suggests that the offensive may have taken the enemy by surprise.

The momentum of the Plaine des Jarres operation, originally intended as a diversion, evidently has led Vang Pao, who has long talked about retaking the entire Plaine, to expand his objectives. A similar situation developed in late April when Vang Pao, heady with his initial successes against the Route 4 area, pressed on to capture the enemy stronghold of Xieng Khouangville. That offensive precipitated a sharp enemy rebuff and led to the loss of a number of government holdings near the Plaine.

There is also some tenuous evidence that the government's initial successes in the Plaine may have come as a result of an earlier withdrawal of some North Vietnamese combat troops.

large numbers of North Vietnamese troops moved

east during mid-August.

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The military gains of the past several weeks are testimony to the resilience of Vang Pao's troops, as well as to the difficulties the Communists have in maintaining combat operations during the height of the rainy season. Vang Pao's efforts, however, are not directed toward regaining his bases in Samneua and northern Xieng Khouang provinces, from which the guerrillas were driven during the past dry season. He has successfully retaken these bases every year during the rainy season, and unless he does so again fairly soon, the Communists will be in a stronger position in the north than they have enjoyed since 1962.

Government forces have also been active in the south, where they are pushing into long-held enemy territory south and east of Muong Phalane. Although the enemy is only slowly reacting to these encroachments, past experience indicates that they will not long accept the presence of government troops near the vital Communist infiltration corridor.

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**SECRET****EUROPE**

Peking held first place in Moscow's attention as the Soviets continued their anti-Chinese propaganda. The death of Ho Chi Minh has probably altered some Soviet diplomatic plans for the near future, and Premier Kosygin seems to be the best bet to head Moscow's funeral delegation to Hanoi. Meanwhile, in preparing to receive Japanese Foreign Minister Aichi, the Soviets made it clear that they had no intention of giving Tokyo any satisfaction on the question of the Kurile Islands, which the USSR has held since World War II.

The weariness of defeat has settled over Czechoslovakia after the abortive demonstrations on the anniversary of the invasion, and there are signs that the party's conservatives are pressing the leadership to take advantage of the national mood to disgrace Dubcek completely and remove him and his liberal cohorts.

Poland and Hungary are seeking ways to improve political as well as economic ties with the US and West Germany. Romania's Ceausescu is on an official visit to Iran. This, his second state visit to a non-Communist country this year, ushers in a series of high-level Romanian contacts with the free world.

Yugoslavia is playing host to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. While wary of each other, both Belgrade and Moscow see advantages in regularizing state relations. Bulgaria is planning big celebrations on 9 September to honor the 25th anniversary of its "liberation"; a number of high-level Communist personages, including Soviet President Podgorny, are expected.

At the Geneva disarmament conference, substantial support is developing for the revised Soviet draft of a treaty on seabed arms control. Most delegations view the draft as a significant move by Moscow to accommodate the US position and are hopeful that the remaining differences can be cleared away in short order.

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## FASTER CLAMPDOWN IS LIKELY IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

The tempo of attacks by pro-Soviet party conservatives on last year's liberals is building to a crescendo, and purges of the party and government will probably come soon.

The party presidium met this week and took some decisions, as yet unannounced, on personnel and organizational matters. A party central committee session is scheduled for this month to ratify these decisions and probably to complete the disgrace of Dubcek, Smrkovsky, and others associated with the 1968 reform. Western press services report rumors that the Interior Ministry has prepared a case against Dubcek and is awaiting party orders to arrest him.

Some of the most outspoken ultraliberals, such as world chess champion Ludek Pachman, reportedly have been arrested, and others are under investigation. The conservative-controlled mass media are replete with demands for bringing obstreperous youths, intellectuals, and labor union members under strict control. Teachers have been threatened by the minister of education with reprisals if they fail to revert to an orthodox Communist curriculum. The government leadership, including Premier Cernik, is being severely criticized for its lethargy

and ineptitude in dealing with the economic plight of the country.

Party chief Husak is under growing pressure from the conservatives to move from a middle path to one of Marxist orthodoxy. There is a widespread belief in Prague that Husak would have been purged if he had failed to control the population during the anniversary of the Soviet invasion. Despite the fact that Moscow has publicly recognized Husak's achievement at that critical time, and the successful reopening of schools without incident on 1 September, the Soviets are pushing him to adopt more repressive controls. Conservative spokesman Vilem Novy, who had just returned from the USSR, implied in a speech on 2 September that Husak was secure in his position only as long as he continued to introduce regressive measures.

Soviet politburo member Mazurov, who led the Russian delegation to the Slovak anniversary celebrations, pointedly told the Czechoslovaks that "...much remains to be done" to eliminate the "errors" of the liberal reformists. General Yepishhev, the political chief of the Soviet armed forces, who supervised contingency preparations in Czechoslovakia between 6-21 August, made a similar assessment of the situation in a Red Star article on 31 August after he returned home. 25X1

## LIMITED RESULTS EXPECTED FROM SOVIET-YUGOSLAV TALKS

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko arrived in Belgrade on 2 September for a four-day visit that both sides hope will reduce some of the frictions between the two governments.

The areas of disagreement are well defined, however, and both sides recognize that prospects for a genuine reconciliation are not bright.

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Both Moscow and Belgrade have taken measures in recent months to establish the correct atmosphere for the visit by halting polemical press exchanges. Belgrade demonstrated its sincerity on this score by banning the 31 August issue of Knizevne Novine, which was highly critical of Soviet policy in Czechoslovakia. At the same time, the aura of limited expectations surrounding the visit is reflected in the fact that neither Moscow nor Belgrade has given the visit more than the required minimum of publicity.

The first two days of the visit support a pessimistic appraisal of the possible results. They were devoted to a general exchange of views between Gromyko and Yugoslav Foreign Minister Tepavac that were described merely as "frank," a word used to imply the existence of differences.

Gromyko was to see Tito in Brioni on 3 September. Something of more substance may be achieved when the discussions touch upon subjects such as the Middle East and a European security conference, where the two sides have a common interest.

Gromyko's visit is useful to the Yugoslavs because it reaffirms Belgrade's Communist credentials, and the Yugoslavs are also hopeful of increasing their economic exchanges with the Soviets. But Belgrade will make it clear to Moscow that its long-established independence in the Communist world is not negotiable. Moscow probably looks on the visit as a show of diplomatic reasonableness that may help ensure continued Yugoslav restraint in commenting on Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia and elsewhere in Eastern Europe. [REDACTED]

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### USSR PREPARING REPLY TO ALLIED OFFER OF BERLIN TALKS

The Soviets apparently are preparing to respond to last month's Allied suggestion of talks on modalities of the Berlin situation, despite apparent East German discomfiture over the initiative. The Western allies proposed that the four powers invite the West and East Germans to open talks on possible improvements with respect to access, communications, and other matters. A Soviet Embassy official in East Berlin recently commented to a British diplomat that the Allies would be "receiving our reply shortly."

Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov probably briefed the East Germans on the Soviet response when he conferred with Foreign Minister Winzer in East Berlin on 29 August. Winzer then traveled to Moscow for an apparently hastily arranged meet-

ing with Foreign Minister Gromyko on the eve of the latter's departure for Yugoslavia on 2 September. This chain of events suggests that the East Germans are not completely happy with the Soviet reply and that differences between Pankow and Moscow on this issue have not been resolved.

The East Germans have made it clear that they do not care to talk with the Federal Republic about various inter-German issues as suggested by the Allies as long as Bonn is unwilling to grant diplomatic recognition to the East German Government and to meet other standard preconditions. Nevertheless, the Soviets have hinted clearly that they will respond in a positive, though perhaps general, way to the Allied initiative. [REDACTED]

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## MOSCOW TO EXPAND ECONOMIC TIES WITH JAPAN

Encouraged by prospects of further Japanese investment in Siberia, Moscow has stepped up efforts to expand economic relations with Japan. The USSR is increasing imports of Japanese goods and has invited high-level Japanese officials and technical delegations to visit the USSR in an effort to encourage increased economic cooperation.

In the first six months of this year the Soviet imports from Japan reached \$121 million, a 70 percent increase over the first half of 1968, and matched the previous record level of 1966. Purchases of Japanese steel and machinery doubled and imports of textiles increased fourfold. In May, Moscow, which purchases most of its complete plants in Western Europe, contracted for a \$24-million ammonia plant. Negotiations also are taking place for other plants, including a \$50-million ethylene installation.

The upswing in Soviet purchases is in part a response to Japanese concern over the long-standing trade imbalance with the USSR. Last year Soviet exports to Japan amounted to \$460 million while imports totaled only \$180 million. Trade in the first half of 1969 continues to favor the USSR by some \$90 million, but the imbalance is about one third below Japan's mid-year deficit in 1968.

Moscow recently has taken the initiative to improve economic relations. Last month several influential Japanese legislators and the finance and agricultural ministers were invited to visit the USSR.

Japanese automobile experts are going to the USSR for bilateral exchanges at Soviet invitation and two Japanese technical delegations will tour Soviet power facilities this month.

These moves probably derive from Soviet hopes to attract further Japanese investment in Siberia. Last month the two countries reached preliminary agreement on a Siberian venture under which Japan is to supply machinery and equipment in exchange for some \$350-million worth of pulpwood and wood chips. This follows a similar arrangement concluded last year under which the Japanese will receive payment through delivery of \$160-million worth of Siberian timber over a five-year period. Japanese equipment has passed Soviet sub-Arctic tests and the project is expected to be in full operation by the end of the year.

The Japanese appear to be satisfied with the timber development projects, but remain doubtful about long-range, ambitious projects to develop Siberian copper, coal, and oil resources, which require much greater amounts of Japanese capital. Moscow also is taking a more realistic approach and recent efforts have centered on studies to improve Soviet Far East port facilities, which the Japanese regard as critical if other investments in Siberia are to prove profitable. In July the findings of Japanese shipping experts who inspected Siberian ports earlier in the month were reviewed by Moscow.

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## SOVIET ECONOMIC REFORM LOSES MOMENTUM

The Soviet economic reform, now in its fourth year, appears to be stalled by the conservatism of the present leadership. The reform, designed to improve production efficiency, has produced only minor improvements in management and incentives.

Some of the most important goals of the reform have not been realized. There has been little improvement in the supply system for industrial materials. The enterprise manager has not gained the promised freedom to regulate the size of his labor force, to negotiate with his suppliers, or to make important production and investment decisions. Moreover, conflict between enterprise autonomy and the goals of the central planners will persist until there is a major improvement in the method of determining prices. The conservative mood of the leadership precludes such a fundamental change and for the time being dooms the reform to its present limited dimensions.

The pace of the reform lags behind the original timetable, which called for completion of the changeover in industry by the end of last year. By mid-August only about 72 percent of Soviet industrial enterprises had transferred to the new system. The most successful enterprises were

transferred first, and the resulting favorable performance of the new system during 1966-67 is being diluted as less profitable enterprises join their ranks.

The minor improvements growing out of the reform include more efficient use of equipment and materials by enterprise managers and the disposal of excess stocks. The enterprise manager now has a bit more control over investment, making it more responsive to his needs. The reform's emphasis on sales and profitability also has resulted in greater concern for customer demands. The reform, moreover, continues to represent a first step away from the command-type economy, and it focuses attention on some basic faults of the system, stimulating thought about the need for more sweeping changes.

A loss of enthusiasm for the reform and a sense of frustration are increasingly evident in the Soviet press. A recent Izvestia article reported that the majority of those questioned in a poll taken at a large machinebuilding plant claimed that the reform's impact on them personally and on production had been insignificant.

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## POLES SEEK IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH US

Polish officials have been making it increasingly clear that they think the time is ripe for a major improvement in relations with the US. Warsaw evidently wishes to repair its image, which was marred last year by Western charges of anti-Semitism there, and by Poland's participation in the invasion of Czechoslovakia. It also has particular economic and political objectives.

The regime's permission for Poland's second ranking Roman Catholic prelate, Cardinal Wojtyla of Krakow, to visit the US this month is the latest in a series of moves designed to project a new appearance of reasonableness, confidence, and independence in Poland's policy toward the West as a whole. The Polish leadership probably hopes that favorable publicity surrounding the visit will bolster its other moves toward at least partially regaining the "special relationship" with the US that the Gomulka regime enjoyed in its early years. There are also signs that President Nixon's visit to Romania brought home to Polish leaders the extent of their loss of status with Washington, and may have contributed to their decision to seek improved relations.

In recent weeks, Polish officials have been responsive to a long list of standing US proposals for settling a number of bilateral economic and political issues. They have expressed interest in resuming stalled negotiations on a consular

agreement, and in concluding a civil air accord.

The Poles may be seeking a package economic settlement. Hinting at significant future purchases, the Poles have spoken of their "promising" private talks in the US for the purchase of two petrochemical plants, and of their interest in the idea of building hotels in Poland with private American financing. These overtures reflect not only a desire to ensure retention of the most-favored-nation status in mutual trade, but also a need to acquire technology and know-how from the US.

Politically, the Poles are interested in securing US backing for a European security conference and, specifically, for their own arms control and disarmament proposals. Foreign Minister Jedrychowski probably will focus on these topics when he meets with ranking US officials during the UN General Assembly session this month. Jedrychowski hopes to be invited to Washington for more detailed talks.

Mindful that a Polish - West German political rapprochement would be a major element of any prospective European settlement, Warsaw evidently hopes that parallel dialogues with both Bonn and Washington will help to protect its interests if any East-West negotiations develop. Gomulka probably has Soviet approval for these initiatives, but he is likely also to be motivated by anxiety that Moscow may seek to secure its European flank at Poland's expense.

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## LITTLE CHANGE SEEN IN NORWEGIAN ELECTION

No surprises and little change are expected as a result of Norway's parliamentary elections scheduled for 7-8 September.

The present center-right coalition, which came to power in 1965 after nearly a generation of Labor Party government, has suffered no significant erosion in popularity during its term in office. The coalition parties collectively received 49.5 percent of the vote in the last election, and 49.1 percent in the most recent sample taken by the Norwegian Gallup organization. The comparable figures for the main opposition, the Labor Party, are 43.1 and 44.4 percent. Efforts by the various political parties to arouse interest in the elections have been largely unavailing. According to a poll on the issues facing the electorate, Norwegian voters have no particular complaints. The greatest issue--and that is not a burning one--is the introduction of a value-added tax on the continental model. Appeals based on for-

eign policy issues have found little response.

Despite the stability of the Norwegian political scene, there are elements of uncertainty. Even before the campaign, nearly half of the members of Parliament announced their retirement or were not renominated by their parties. According to close observers of the political scene, Norway is experiencing the greatest generation shift in its leadership since 1945. Another factor is the sharp expansion of the electorate to a record of nearly 2.6 million as a result of the lowering of the voting age to 20. The various political parties have attempted to brighten their image to appeal to youth, but if Norway follows the Nordic pattern, most of the new voters may prove to be more apathetic than their elders, thus not significantly altering the narrow political balance.

The prospects are that the government may lose two to four seats, reducing slightly the present 80-70 ratio in Parliament. Although Labor Party leaders are asserting that a minority one-party government under their auspices is still a distinct possibility, the four government parties are already dickering for cabinet portfolios in anticipation of their return to office. In either case, the resulting government would be more vulnerable to shifts in parliamentary and public opinion and could thus be expected to avoid controversy.

## STRENGTH OF NORWEGIAN PARTIES

	Parliamentary Elections September 1965	Gallup Poll ** July 1969
*Conservatives	21.0 %	21.1 %
*Christian Peoples	8.2	8.0
*Center	9.9	9.8
*Liberals	10.4	10.2
Labor	43.1	44.4
Socialist Peoples	6.0	5.0
Communist	1.4	1.5
	100.0 %	100.0 %

\*Parties in the government

\*\*Margin of error - 2 to 3%

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**MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA**

Following the pattern of military take-over that is becoming traditional in the Arab world, junior Libyan Army officers on 1 September toppled the monarchy of King Idris and established the Libyan Arab Republic. A clear political coloration has not yet emerged, but the familiar slogans and "socialist" label adopted by the new government indicate it will probably not follow conservative policies. US oil interests do not seem to be immediately threatened, but the future of Wheelus Air Base is another matter.

Tensions between Israel and Syria rose sharply after two members of an Arab fedayeen group landed a hijacked TWA aircraft in Damascus on 29 August. Although repatriation was arranged for most passengers, the Syrians detained two male Israelis who had been aboard. Israel reacted vigorously, of course, muttering vague threats of punitive action, but for the time being it is trying to force the release of the captives through international pressures. Syria's leaders are clearly aware of the potential dangers of retaliation, however, and it seems likely that they will try to find some face-saving means of returning the captives.

The Arab "mini" summit in Cairo attended by Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, and the Sudan ended on 3 September with a rather bland statement calling for greater unified Arab effort against Israel. The sixth OAU heads of state conference convenes in Addis Ababa on 6 September. The main issues most likely to be emphasized are the perennial ones of condemnation of the white southern Africa regimes and support for the African liberation movements.

Kofi Busia became Ghana's first freely elected civilian leader in more than a decade, following a landslide victory by his party in parliamentary elections held on 29 August. The decisive victory will ease the transition from military to civilian rule, but long-term stability is less certain as the new government faces massive economic problems.

Sporadic fighting continues in the Nigerian civil war, but the over-all military situation remains stalemated.

Meanwhile, a Soviet naval flotilla arrived at Lagos on 1 September for a good-will stop, and was expected to leave for the Indian Ocean on 4 September.

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## ARAB TERRORISTS BRING HIJACKED AIRCRAFT TO SYRIA

Tensions between Israel and Syria rose sharply this week when two members of the Arab fedayeen People's Front for the Liberation of Palestine landed a hijacked airplane in Damascus on 29 August. Although repatriation was promptly arranged for most of the passengers from the TWA 707, which had been on an international flight from Los Angeles to Tel Aviv, the Syrians detained two male Israelis who had been aboard.

The hijacking caught the Syrians by surprise, and they were obviously not too happy over the incident. Nevertheless, the "progressive" Arab regime in Damascus had to support the fedayeen action and maintain a strong anti-Israeli stance. The Syrians have recently been hinting that they would like to increase contacts with the West and to see greater international use of the new airport outside Damascus. In the face of mounting Western pressure, they sought to improve their image by allowing four Israeli women passengers to leave.

they wanted to hit at the US through its interests in the Middle East for its support of Israel--particularly the selling of F-4 Phantom aircraft. Secondly, they wanted to get their hands on an Israeli--unidentified--who they alleged was responsible for "much misery and death of the Palestinian peoples."

Israel, of course, reacted vigorously, and muttered vague threats of punitive action against Syria. Although Israeli's leaders and press cooled down somewhat in the days following the hijacking, they were extremely irritated when most of the passengers and crew left Damascus, charging that the US and TWA had "abandoned" the two male Israeli passengers who were identified as private citizens. For the time being, however, the Israelis are trying to activate further international diplomatic and other pressures to force the release of the captives.

Israeli tempers are still short, but Tel Aviv will probably continue to hold off any punitive action until Syria clarifies the fate of the two captives. Israeli officials have rejected Syrian hints of a possible exchange of the men for two Israeli-held Syrian pilots, saying that the release must be unconditional, but Tel Aviv may reconsider if current pressures prove ineffective. If peaceful means do not work--or if it appears that Syria is about to execute the prisoners--Israel almost certainly will mount some sort of punitive military action, although its options are restricted by the presence of 4,000 resident Jews in Syria. Damascus is clearly aware of the potential dangers to the country's military and economic installations, and it seems likely that, rather than risk retaliation, Syria's leaders will try to find some face-saving means of returning the captives.

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## KOFI BUSIA TO LEAD GHANA'S NEW CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT

Kofi Busia, a pro-Western former university professor, was sworn in this week as Ghana's first freely elected civilian leader since 1956, but his government will not formally take power until the end of the month. The decisive victory by Busia's Progress Party in the parliamentary elections on 29 August should ease the transition from military to civilian rule.

The Progress Party, whose top leaders had the longest record of opposition to Nkrumah, won 104 of the 140 seats contested. Chances for a smooth transition were also enhanced by the orderly nature of the election and by Busia's pre-election endorsement of a constitutional provision that temporarily entrusts the presidency to a commission composed of key military and police figures.

Cries of foul and hints of a boycott of the new National Assembly are emanating from the camp of Busia's chief rival, Komla Gbedemah, but they present no real danger to the changeover, and Gbedemah himself seems inclined to accept the outcome. Gbedemah, though victorious in his constituency, faces a legal challenge to his eligibility to sit in the assembly.

Longer range prospects for stability are clouded, however, by evidence that tribal animosities played a significant role in the Progress Party's decisive victory. Gbedemah showed con-

sistent strength only among his fellow Ewe tribesmen, many of whom almost certainly see the outcome as an anti-Ewe manifestation. Serious problems could arise should the winners view the result as a mandate to carry out the tribal purges that some Progress Party members desire.

Busia also faces a potential challenge to his own role as leader of the party. A soft-spoken intellectual, he is untested in high government office and there remains some question about his ability to lead. He is certain to face stiff pressures from ambitious younger party members, some of whom would like to replace him with a more vigorous leader.

The new government's main immediate preoccupation will almost certainly be with economic matters, especially the enormous external debt inherited from the Nkrumah era and the related problem of stimulating a resumption of Ghana's interrupted economic growth. For a time at least, Busia is likely to continue the military regime's harsh deflationary policies at home while seeking further accommodations from foreign creditors. Any sustained application of severe domestic austerity--which has already produced high unemployment--will inevitably aggravate domestic discontent. Busia's ability to deal effectively with these problems could well be the crucial test of his regime's staying power.

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## ZAMBIA'S PRESIDENT MOVES TO CONTROL TRIBALISM

President Kenneth Kaunda has assumed personal control of Zambia's political apparatus in an attempt to halt a bitter struggle along tribal and regional lines for the country's number-two position. Kaunda's move has at least temporarily averted an open break among party leaders, but their basic antagonisms will hamper his efforts to rebuild political unity.

Tribal rivalries in the ruling United Independence Party (UNIP), which dominates Zambia politics, became more bitter two years ago. At that time, Vice President Simon Kapwepwe, leader of the assertive northern Bemba tribe, engineered a stunning victory over ill-prepared opponents in elections for party posts. The losers have been out for revenge ever since, and apparently were on the verge of ousting him from all top party and government positions at a party meeting last month when Kaunda, concerned about a possible break-up of the party, adjourned the meeting.

Shortly thereafter, Kaunda took personal control. He replaced the former party structure with an interim executive committee that he himself heads and that divests the other party leaders of individual responsibilities. He also announced that membership in the top party organization would no longer necessarily lead to a cabinet appointment, and followed up

these actions with an extensive reshuffling of government positions.

A major objective of Kaunda's actions apparently was to placate the pro- and anti-Kapwepwe forces. On the one hand, Kapwepwe lost the vice presidency of the party and his finance and development portfolios in the government; on the other, Kaunda kept Kapwepwe as vice president of the government and made minor moves against leading elements of the anti-Kapwepwe forces. Finally, Kaunda apparently dropped his custom of distributing party and government appointments equally among Zambia's four major tribal groupings, in order to balance the pro- and anti-Kapwepwe factions that most threaten national unity.

Kaunda's moves are not likely to arouse direct opposition in the foreseeable future, but his ability to win long-term acceptance of the new political structure is unclear. Much will depend on the power that Kaunda gives to new UNIP structures and how strongly he reacts to future infighting among political elements for government prerogatives. A sincere democrat, Kaunda has sought to develop political procedures that combine free elections with persuasion and consensus. The extent of tribal and regional infighting has deeply shocked him, however, and he may decide that considerable personal direction will be necessary.

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## MILITARY JUNTA SEIZES CONTROL IN LIBYA

Following the pattern of military take-over that has become traditional in the Arab world, junior officers of the Libyan Army moved early on the morning of 1 September to topple the monarchy of King Idris and establish the Libyan Arab Republic.

To forestall any possible opposition as it consolidates its power, the new regime imposed a curfew, suspended a number of newspapers, and dissolved all constitutional bodies. Power will be exercised through a military-dominated Revolutionary Command Council. The membership of this group--aside from its head, Saad ad Din Abu Shuwayrib--is unknown at this time. Abu Shuwayrib, a lieutenant colonel who retired from the army two years ago, may be serving as a figurehead, much as General Naguib did in the early days of Nasir's revolution, until the actual coup leaders feel confident enough to step forward.

The success of the coup resulted in large measure from the almost immediate collapse of the civilian security forces--a development arising from the nature of Libya's government. In a cultural milieu that emphasizes strong patriarchal leadership, King Idris had concentrated all political power and decision-making in his own hands. When the coup occurred, Idris was vacationing in Turkey, having been away from Libya since June.

It appears that the civilian security forces, whose manpower is almost twice that of the army, were either unable or unwilling to act unless given direct orders. The timing of the coup was undoubtedly intended to take advantage of the King's absence, for had he been on the scene it is likely that he would have taken personal command of the security forces and put down the coup.

The political coloration of the new regime is unknown at this time. But the use of characteristic slogans and the labeling of the new republic as "socialist" indicates the new government will probably not follow the conservative policies of its predecessor. It is likely, for example, to adopt a much more militant stance in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The secrecy surrounding the membership of the Revolutionary Command Council may result from a jockeying for control among various factions representing a wide spectrum of political ideologies.

The chances that King Idris will regain his throne are slimmer with each passing day, and he does not appear to be seriously considering an immediate return. Crown Prince Hasan al-Rida, around whom Idris' supporters might conceivably have gathered, quickly renounced all rights to the throne. Idris' own tribes and the members of the religious brotherhood he heads do not seem

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to have the arms necessary to challenge the army seriously, although a few isolated pockets of resistance may appear.

The junta has promised to honor all existing treaties and agreements. US oil interests, therefore, are apparently in no danger for the immediate future.

Reports indicate that, except for a few momentary stoppages, oil operations have continued as usual. The new regime seems likely to be as interested in continuing oil revenues as was its predecessor. Wheelus Air Base is another matter, however, and it is doubtful that the junta will long agree to a continued US presence at the base.

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**SECRET****WESTERN HEMISPHERE**

The illness of Brazilian President Costa e Silva was the highlight of events in the Western Hemisphere last week. The military bypassed the constitutional successor, Vice President Pedro Aleixo, and the three military ministers assumed power. Opposition to the triumvirate among high-ranking army officers, however, could threaten the delicate facade of military unity.

President Lleras of Colombia shuffled cabinet and gubernatorial posts last week. These changes, and the possibility that additional ones are imminent, are likely to aggravate his political difficulties. The crisis comes at a bad time for Lleras' government. Tax reform measures pending before Congress are in difficulty, and party conventions to pick candidates for next year's presidential election are due next month.

General elections scheduled for 5 September in the Netherlands Antilles could generate unrest in the six-island federation. The elections were called after rioting swept the capital last May and forced the government to resign. Union leaders have indicated that if a new government is unresponsive to labor demands, it risks a repetition of the disorders. Some leftist extremists could spark new outbreaks of violence.

Leftists in the Chilean Congress took advantage of absenteeism on the part of deputies of President Frei's Christian Democratic Party to schedule discussion of a leftist-drafted copper nationalization bill. Although the Christian Democrats may be able to stall further activity until the legislative session ends on 18 September, there is a possibility that the bill will be passed and sent to the Senate for action.

President Velasco Ibarra of Ecuador took a strong stand in the face of urban disorders supporting the attempt of the country's mayors to lengthen their term of office to four years. Velasco firmly supported the legislature's refusal to consider the mayors' demands, and the urban workers, who had tied up the capital and other major cities for several days with strikes, ceased their resistance.

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## MILITARY TRIUMVIRATE TAKES OVER IN BRAZIL


The military has bypassed the constitution and assumed "caretaker" direction of the government following President Costa e Silva's severe stroke last week. The three military ministers have formed a triumvirate to govern during the President's "temporary impediment" under the authority of Institutional Act 12, which they issued on 31 August, as well as all previous institutional acts and the constitution. The act expressly states that the President will resume power upon recovering.

Costa e Silva is partially paralyzed and will be unable to govern for many weeks.

The triumvirate is an ill-assorted group to govern Brazil for any length of time. The senior officer, Navy Minister Rademaker Grunewald, is a tough-minded

conservative, as is Air Minister Souza e Mello. Widely respected Army Minister Lyra Tavares is more moderate, but he is unlikely to jeopardize military unity and his own prospects for succession by pushing for a return to constitutional formalities that practically no one in the military wants. There are already allegations that Lyra has caused dissension in the triumvirate by refusing to concede leadership to the senior member, the navy minister.

Opposition to the junta among high-ranking army officers is already threatening military unity. The US defense attaché reports that many general officers and others are extremely unhappy with the triumvirate arrangement and that some malcontents appear to be trying to whip up some sort of challenge to the junta. Clearly many top generals feel slighted that they were not consulted prior to the decision to take over the reins of government. Some officers



Air Minister Souza e Mello



Army Minister Lyra Tavares

Navy Minister  
Rademaker Grunewald

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believe a single leader should have been named; others think the three ministers are "unsuitable" because they are not on active duty; still others resent the fact that the air force and navy have been accorded equality in the triumvirate with the army.

continuation of present economic policies. The disorganized civilian opposition is unlikely to be able to put together more than a token protest.

The military's take-over has pushed aside Costa e Silva's plans to issue a new constitution and reopen the recently purged Congress. The officers now in the saddle clearly believe that pursuing the goals of the 1964 revolution--purging subversives and corrupt politicians and "straightening out" the country--are more important than constitutional formalities.

Maneuvering and growing dissent in the military are almost certain to undercut the triumvirate's ability to govern effectively for more than a short period. Ambitious officers who see themselves as qualified for the presidency are already jockeying for position. A conflict apparently has been developing between conservative old-guard officers and Young Turks who favor nationalistic solutions to Brazil's problems and sweeping economic and social reforms. If it becomes clear that Costa e Silva will not recover, this agitation is likely to boil over and could jeopardize the military unity, which is the key to Brazilian stability.

Vice President Aleixo, the constitutionally designated successor, is a civilian and has never been trusted by the military. The decision to bypass him has almost complete support among the officers.

The business community reportedly has greeted the new government with enthusiasm, anticipating a

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## DISSENSION SURFACES ON CHILEAN LEFT

The Socialist Party has nominated pro-Castro Senator Salvador Allende as its candidate for the presidential election in September 1970. Allende will have trouble uniting his party behind him, however, as well as forging a broad leftist electoral coalition.

Allende's nomination was an apparent victory over extremists within the Socialist Party who favor armed struggle rather than electoral action. Allende had to accede, however, to demands for a narrow electoral coalition rather than the broader grouping he favored. Since his nomination, extremists have been trying to lock him into a posi-

tion emphasizing the necessity for violent revolutionary action.

Allende had hoped to have Communist and Radical Party support as well as the backing of the United Popular Action Movement (MAPU), a breakaway group of Christian Democrats. Extremist Socialists, however, will not accept the Radical Party, which they characterize as "bourgeois." The Communists favor Allende's candidacy, but should he be unable to control the extremists within his party they may run their own candidate.

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Senator Salvador Allende

Socialist extremists have seized on the death of a party member at the hands of police during demonstrations last week to restate their position. At funeral services they made violent speeches setting the stage for another confrontation with the government. A taped speech by a fugitive leader of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left criticized "cowards and pseudorevolutionaries" for responding to the "siren song of electoral opportunism" rather than the call to armed struggle. Allende so far has avoided public comment, but his position will become increasingly awkward if clashes with police become more severe.

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## DOMINICAN REPUBLIC FACES FURTHER DISORDERS

Last week's leftist-inspired strike opened the campaign to force President Balaguer not to run for re-election next year. The results suggest the opposition will intensify efforts to promote violence and embarrass the government.

Balaguer's tough public stand and a show of military force successfully blunted Communist plans for inciting widespread disorders, but sporadic incidents during the three-day shutdown caused an estimated seven deaths and numerous injuries. The strike was effective, at least initially, in the capital and the nation's second largest city, although the government declared it illegal. Rumored right-wing support for the strike did not materialize. Leftists remain hopeful, however, that if Balaguer announces his candidacy, rightists will join them in all-out opposition to the government.

The leftists' assessment of the strike as relatively successful may prompt them to continue their efforts. Their campaign portrays the government as iso-

lated, military backed, and repressive. The opposition apparently believes that these charges are substantiated by the strict security measures the administration is forced to adopt in response to their provocations.

Balaguer, although still publicly uncommitted on re-election, seems more and more a candidate. He has done nothing to discourage either his civilian or military supporters from openly touting his candidacy, and he has trimmed the power of those party officials who are promoting Vice President Lora--his most serious rival at this point--for the Reformist Party nomination.

As long as the President remains in the race, the campaign will center on "continuismo"--the charge that Balaguer wants to perpetuate himself in power by using the heavy-handed tactics of the Trujillo years. Balaguer probably can defeat any other potential candidate at the polls, but if he announces for re-election, the most serious obstacle to a second term may well be leftist-provoked violence in the streets.

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## EL SALVADOR AND HONDURAS CONTINUE ARMS BUILDUP

Although both El Salvador and Honduras disclaim any aggressive intent and maintain that their arms purchases are strictly defensive, it is generally believed in both countries that hostilities will resume.

Hondurans point to the unabated propaganda campaign in El Salvador, and their neighbor's reluctant and limited compliance with OAS suggestions for relieving tensions. El Salvador's successes in obtaining arms and aircraft are also keeping tensions high.

Alarmed by reports of shipments already received, Honduras has intensified its efforts to rearm.

The main burden of Salvadoran press and radio commentary has been the attention of several thousand Salvadorans in Honduran "concentration camps." Honduran officials have been attempting with some success to have news media tone down anti-Salvadoran commentary and allow for some cooling of tempers. Widespread fear that fighting may resume and that Honduras is ill prepared to defend itself may, in time, weaken the feeling of national unity and cause political problems for President Lopez.

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